Toyota: ...biggest and most deadly corporate cover up of all times...

The photo below of the badly mangled Toyota was posted, even as Toyota was blaming 'Driver Error' and floor mats.

Toyota Sudden Acceleration Problems Mount
March 9, 2010

I am investigating whether this horrific crash that nearly killed my wonderful young client was caused by a faulty Toyota accelerator.

Here are the latest developments in what I believe may be the biggest and most deadly corporate cover up of all time:

1. Yesterday Toyota finally added the Prius to its limited list of defective cars that needed to be recalled -- only after one suddenly sped up to more than 90 m.p.h. in San Diego. Prius drivers had already complained 406 times of these sudden and potentially fatal accelerations before this glorified car was recalled.

2. Last week the family of Mark Sayles filed suit, whose Lexus suddenly accelerated to 120 miles per hour on a San Diego interstate last August before tragically crashing and killing this 45 year old police officer, his wife, daughter, and his wife's brother. SEE PREVIOUS STORY.

It was not until their terrifying 911 tape was posted to UTube that Toyota finally began recalling its defective vehicles in September. Toyota has blamed the floor mats for getting tangled up with the gas pedal.

At least 52 people have died and hundreds have been seriously injured in these sudden accelerator crashes.

Toyota has already recalled more than 6 million of its defective vehicles just here in the U.S.

3. On Monday, a 2006 internal memo was released proving that the company knew that its vehicles were defective. Toyota's own assembly line workers warned the company that its quality had deteriorated and that more safety inspections were necessary. What did Toyota do? It ignored the problems, of course.

4. Furthermore, Toyota issued what these assembly workers called "secret recalls," in which owners were told to bring in their cars for "routine checkups," the dealer replaced defective parts, and then billed the owner for the work that it should have paid for.

5. "Everything Toyota does is hidden," Fumio Matsuda, 84, often called the Ralph Nader of Japan for his investigation into shoddy car making practices, wrote this week.

Matuda added: "I believe there will eventually be criminal charges. They knew there were problems with their cars, but they didn't do anything until they were pressured."

You may not be old enough (I am) to remember that Ralph Nader, an attorney, got his start in 1965 documenting the unsafe features of the Chevy Corvair and other models in his ground breaking book Unsafe At Any Speed.. Nader showed how American car manufacturers deliberately designed cars that lacked vital safety features and instead used that money to add fancy styling that could even hurt drivers, like metal dashboards, confusing gear shift knobs, overweighted front tires, faulty rear suspensions, etc.

I was a member of TEXPIRG, Nader's public interest law firm, while I attended the University of Texas in the Seventies.

In response, rather than fix its defective cars, GM outrageously tried to silence Nader by bullying him, illegally wire tapping his phone calls, following him, interviewing every one he talked to, libeling him in the press, and even sending women to lure him into sexual liasons so they could blackmail him.

6. Last week, an Illinois engineering professor released test results which showed that Toyota engines could rev without a driver even pressing on the accelerator! So much for the gas pedal/floor mat defense raised by Toyota.

7. A hearing is scheduled on March 25th in San Diego to consolidate the 89 separate lawsuits into one case. Investors are seeking damages due to the diminished value of Toyota's stock price since the recalls began.

8. Multiple shareholder derivative lawsuits have also been filed accusing Toyota of concealing the truth about its defective vehicles, causing share prices to fall.

I challenge Toyota to stop blaming floor mats and gas pedals and fix the electronic throttle controls which are apparently causing these tragic deaths and senseless injuries.
And manufacturers should also include "smart pedals" and provide immediate access to the onboard data recorders so they can monitor real time performance of their vehicles.

http://www.fortworthinjuryattorneyblog.com/2010/03/toyota-accelerator-defects-cou.html
 

Toyota knew:

The early Toyota investigation showed the problems and the luck associated with SUA investigations. NHTSA randomly two vehicles that repeatedly demonstrated SUA. NHTSA knew the problem was in the cruise control computer because if they moved the computer from

the bad Toyota that had SUA to a good Toyota that did not have SUA, the good Toyota developed SUA. When NHTSA tested the vehicles at VRTC, it could not find a failure mode.

3 Ultimately, NHTSA gave the computers to Toyota to take to Japan and test. Although Toyota found a failure mode in the printed circuit board, details of the findings were kept confidential.


Statement of Clarence M. Ditlow

Executive Director, Center for Auto Safety

Before the National Academy of Sciences

On Vehicle Electronic Controls and Sudden Unintended Acceleration

October 12, 2010


Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you on vehicle electronic controls and sudden unintended acceleration. Sudden unintended acceleration has always been recognized as a serious safety hazard. The very first recall obtained by NHTSA’s Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) was on a throttle sticking open in Chrysler vehicles (ODI Investigation 003). The first large and still the fourth largest recall ever was for 6.7 million 1965-70 Chevrolets with defective engine mounts (71V-235). Early sudden acceleration recalls involved mechanical failures that were easy to detect and remedy. Beginning in the late 1970's, electronic controls began to be introduced in vehicles which made it difficult to detect the cause of a sudden acceleration event.

In the mid-1970's NHTSA anticipated the increased use of electronics in vehicles and potential hazards associated with their use beginning with the use of electronic ignitions in 1975. Lacking resources and personnel to adequately evaluate electronic controls, the agency contracted with the Institute for Telecommunications Sciences to assess the potential and methods for electronic magnetic interference (EMI) to cause malfunctions in the electronic controls in vehicles.
1 In a second research phase, the Institute produced Guidelines for Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC).2 Although the agency intended to develop safety standards for electronic controls, no standards were issued.

1
"Investigation of Electromagnetic Interference Effects on Motor Vehicle Electronic Control and Safety Devices" - Oct. 1975

2
"Electromagnetic Interference Effects on Motor Vehicle Electronic Control and Safety Devices, Volume I - Summary" ; NHTSA Study: "Electromagnetic Interference Effects on Motor Vehicle Electronic Control and Safety Devices, Volume II - Measurements, Analysis and Testing"; NHTSA Study: "Electromagnetic Interference Effects on Motor Vehicle Electronic Control and Safety Devices, Volume III - Automotive EMC Guidelines" - Nov. 1976.

With the advent of electronic ignition systems and cruise control systems in the late 1970's and early 1980's sudden acceleration complaints without clear mechanical failures began to appear. NHTSA opened more and more sudden acceleration investigation. Some resulted in recalls for electronic control failures. The first two Toyota sudden acceleration recalls were for replacement of the cruise control computer which could cause sudden acceleration on start up (
86V-132, 90V-040). CAS filed a defect petition (DP86-08) on the vehicles recalled in 1990 which was denied because there wasn’t a "reasonable possibility" that a recall order would issue. More complaints occurred and led to a new investigation (PE90-021) and a recall.

The early Toyota investigation showed the problems and the luck associated with SUA investigations. NHTSA randomly two vehicles that repeatedly demonstrated SUA. NHTSA knew the problem was in the cruise control computer because if they moved the computer from

the bad Toyota that had SUA to a good Toyota that did not have SUA, the good Toyota developed SUA. When NHTSA tested the vehicles at VRTC, it could not find a failure mode.
3 Ultimately, NHTSA gave the computers to Toyota to take to Japan and test. Although Toyota found a failure mode in the printed circuit board, details of the findings were kept confidential. Public materials from this investigation are at http://www.autosafety.org/ea08-045-documents. The limited SUA cruise control computer recall covered only 2 out of 54 complaints cited by NHTSA in the investigation. When asked why the recall wasn’t larger, Toyota said it couldn’t find a problem.

3
1st Recall Request & VRTC Test - 2-28-86

With SUA, one is hunting the proverbial needle in a haystack. The FARS database is virtually useless except to find Toyota crashes in which there was a death. FARS does not pinpoint defects or failure modes. The best example is that FARS often fails to record that there was a fire involved in a crash, much less that fire was the Most Harmful Event.

The EWR death and injury database has potential but it’s not used by NHTSA. It consists of a summary listing M/M/Y, partial VIN, state and date of crash along with the possible component involved. Because there are only 22 components for passenger vehicles, it’s impossible to tell what the defect involved is. Although NHTSA has the authority to get the underlying documents, it seldom does so. Out of 301 EWR summary reports that could be linked to Toyota SUA through 2009, NHTSA requested records on only 16 cases.

NHTSA has its EDR database on 58 Toyota SUA incidents but how they were selected is unknown and come nowhere close to representing a valid sample. For example the sample includes no 2002-06 Toyota Camry’s which have twice as many reports of deaths linked to SUA as the post-2006 Camrys. Unlike the Special Crash Investigation database, the EDR database has no in-depth crash investigation information. There are four Toyota SUA cases in SCI including two that could not find any driver error.

SUA has always been a problem area for NHTSA - it requires significant resources the agency doesn’t have. Only a concerted effort that looks into every source of information can get the job done. It’s not enough to conclude as the agency did in 1989 that if a vehicle failure mode cannot be found, it must be driver error.


http://www.autosafety.org/sites/default/files/NAS%20Testimony.pdf